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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Bill Clark brings his appeal from the District Court decision 
of the Honorable Kathryn Sticklen, District Judge, entered August 
25, 2011, which affirmed (R. 826) the Magistrate's Decision in the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce on August 10, 2010. R. 605. 
Following a three day trial and hundreds of Exhibits and 
extensive post trial briefing, and after receiving proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from each party, the lower 
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 26, 
2010. R. 561. Bill Clark moved the Trial Court to alter or amend 
its Decision but the Magistrate did not change the result (R. 679) 
and Appellant appealed to the District Court from the Order Re: 
Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment entered on September 24, 2010. R. 683. 
When the District Court considers an appeal from the 
magistrate Judge not involving a trial de novo, the District Court 
is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. 
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306 (1992). 
It is Respondent's position that this appeal again involves 
Bill Clark's quibble with studied Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which are well-supported in the record. Appellant in large 
measure still continues to ignore the evidence supporting the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 1 
Court's Findings and Conclusions, the fact that Appellant failed to 
trace his separate property with reasonable certainty and 
particularity, and failed to carry his burden of proof and 
persuasion by the preponderance of the evidence. Reed v. Reed,137 
Idaho 53, 59-60, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002). The Magistrate Court properly 
applied the law, reaching its result well wi thin the bounds of 
discretion and through the exercise of reason. Community property 
principles controlled the Magistrate's findings and decision, which 
were properly and carefully affirmed by the District Court as the 
intermediate appellate court. 
B. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Following trial, the Magistrate ordered post trial briefing 
and reply briefs which addressed the issues on this appeal. The 
Trial Court also ordered Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Respondent's proposed Findings and Conclusions numbered 91 
pages and Appellant's 26 pages. As a result of Appellant's Post 
Trial Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the issues were briefed and argued on September 13, 2010. 
The Trial Court denied Appellant's Post Trial Motion regarding 
Appellant's issues raised again in this appeal. Tr., pages 649-680. 
Before the trial commenced, Defendant sought two pre-trial 
rulings, the first of which was that since his real estate 
development projects were underwater, he wanted essentially all of 
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the community assets. 1 The Court denied that obvious inequitable 
claim and Bill did not pursue the claim at trial. Appellant also 
asked the trial court to rule as a matter of law, as regards the 
first issue on appeal, that since the balance in his retirement 
account (Schwab IRA Account # ... 3713) on the day of trial was less 
than it was on the day of marriage, that automatically it was all 
Appellant's separate property. The Trial Court denied the request 
to ignore 10 years of history in the account, and held that such a 
claim depended upon what the evidence would show. At trial Bill 
could not trace his separate property with reasonable certainty and 
particularity. Worzala v. Worzala,128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 
(1996) . 
At trial Bill sought more assets in other ways. Bill sought 
an unequal division of the net community estate but the Court 
divided the estate equally, finding that Bill's "portrayal of his 
health issues was somewhat disingenuous, given the level of 
activity he enjoyed, and the vigor with which he pursued it, and as 
a result the Court assigned no weight to his claim of poor health 
as a basis to award more property to Bill". Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 27.2 R. 587. 
The Court ruled in a telephone hearing with counsel on January 27, 2010, 
denying both claims of the Appellant. 
2 Findings of Fact '4 found: "An issue was raised with regard to Bill's health. 
In spite of a number of medical issues, which appear to be well managed by Bill, he is 
extraordinarily physically fit and vigorously active for any age. He works out at the 
YMCA four to five times per week, rides both mountain and road bikes three days per 
week, with road rides of up to 40 miles, rides horses, hunts, hikes, snow skis, and 
kayaks technically challenging and physically demanding rapids." R. 562. 
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Bill pursued two additional claims at trial designed so he 
could receive more community assets. In Post Trial Briefing, he 
claimed the parties' principal residence on Stone Point deeded in 
both names was his separate property. Secondly he claimed that he 
had a separate property interest in their Ketchum Condominium 
because of the money paid to him in 2007 for work on the Veltex 
Condominium project, built after marriage from 2002-2004 was not 
income but "capital gains", even though it was not clearly stated 
as capital gain on the 2007 Federal Tax Return. Exhibit 73. The 
second claim failed at trial because Bill Clark could not carry his 
burden of proof or persuasion, and overcome the community 
presumption by tracing his separate property claim with reasonable 
certainty and particularity. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 
1108 (2002); Barton v. Barton, 132 Idaho 394, 973 P.2d 746 (1999); 
and Worzala v. Worzala, supra. 
On appeal to the District Court Bill urged that their 
principal residence on Stone Point was separate property. The 
District Court affirmed the Magistrate's Findings that Stone Point 
was community property. Appellant has now abandoned that issue on 
this Appeal. As a result, it is now the law of the case that Stone 
Point is community property. 
Thus, regarding the first issue on appeal, the District Court 
in its appellate capacity affirmed the Magistrate Court, finding no 
abuse of discretion. R. 832, 835. As to the second issue the 
District Court found Bill "simply failed to meet his burden", "to 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 4 
prove the property was separate with reasonable certainty and 
particularity". R. 839. Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 395, 17 P.3d 
889, 896 (Ct. App. 2001); Weilmunster v. Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 
227, 234, 858 P.2d 766, 773 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. 
Statement of the Facts And Corrections 
to Appellant's Statement of Facts 
The parties married on December 1, 2000. They have one minor 
child,  born   . Amy is employed as an 
Emergency Room Physician and Bill is a real estate development 
consultant. 
Appellant has some misstatements from the Record. 
A. On page 8 of Appellant's Brief, the statement appears, 
"after Bill and Dr. Baruch were married, no funds were put into the 
Veltex Building, LLC", citing Tr. Vol. 1, p. 418, L. 15-19. The 
cite to Vol. 1, p. 418, L.15-19 does not say that. 
B. Appellant states at pages 8 and 9 that Bill's separate 
property consisted of a capital gains distribution in the Ketchum 
Condominium. This is what Bill Clark testified to over objection 
that there was no foundation and the court allowed his testimony 
about the capital gains characterization. R. p. 421, L. 21 to p. 
421, L. 23. Yet, the Court did not believe his capital gains 
characterization in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
found that the distribution was income and was presumed to be 
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community property, since it arose during the marriage. Tr. p. 655, 
L. 12 to p. 656, L. 10; Tr., p. 660, L. 16 to p. 661, L. 2. 
C. Regarding his claim of capital gains Appellant relies 
heavily in this appeal on Exhibit 517A, a purported summary without 
supporting documentation. Exhibit 517A is referred to on pages 9, 
10, and 28 of Appellant's Brief, but it was not admitted in 
evidence. The Clerk's Exhibit List at p. 878 is wrong. Tr., p. 
205, L. 14-18, p. 216, L. 1-4, p. 219, L.11-13. That further, in 
the transcript there is an Exhibit List that appears multiple times 
at the beginning of each day's session which all show that Exhibit 
517A was not admitted. 
D. Appellant, in his brief at p. 6 and 7, refers to the 
withdrawal of monies from IRA # ... 3713 using the phrase that he did 
not "withdraw to himself". The clever choice of words is 
misleading. He did in fact withdraw the funds and funneled those 
monies into his investments. R. 833. Bill refers to these 
withdrawals as "rollovers" which is a way to defer the tax, but it 
doesn't change the fact that it was a withdrawal of funds out of 
the IRA which was spent on his investments and all but lost. 
Pens co Trust and Sterling Trust were strawmen to avoid the tax and 
penalty created by a withdrawal labeling it a rollover. 
Schwab Retirement Accounts 
(Issue No.1) 
Amy had $74,776.85 in her Schwab IRA Account # ... 5317 on the 
date of marriage. Exhibit 32(b). Bill and his attorney conceded 
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at trial that said amount was her separate property 3. R. 441, item 
32. Also see Defendant's Post Trial Brief, Exhibit A, item 32. R. 
286. Amy, on the other hand for good reason, did not concede an 
alleged separate property amount in Bill's Schwab IRA Account 
# ... 3713 on November 30, 2000 of $386,636. The account had a 
balance of $354,350.31 on the day of trial. Exhibit 230. 
Bill's account suffered two significant value decreases during 
marriage, dropping to $249,799.82 at year end 2002, with additional 
los s e sin 2 0 0 8 , bot h due to rna r k e t los s e s. T r. p. 1 0 3 , L . 5 - 7 ; 
Exhibit 235, p. 2324 and p. 2334. During the marriage, in 2005, 
Bill removed $100,000 from his Schwab IRA # ... 3713 (Exhibit 235, 
Bates p. 2328) and deposited it into his Pensco Trust Account and 
removed it and invested it in Pearson Partners, which was awarded 
to Bill in the sum of $37,212. R. 593. In 2008 Bill took another 
$150,000 4 out of the Schwab IRA (Exhibit 234, p. 2334), deposited 
it into his Pens co Trust Account and removed it and invested it 
into the Crescent Rim Condominium Project in violation of the TRO 
(Tr., p. 368, L. 18) through the vehicle of Meyer Clark LLC, all 
without permission of Amy. Findings of Fact #48-49, Tr., p. 183, L. 
18-25. The I. R.A. money invested in Crescent Rim was worthless 
3 As stated by the District Court, oral stipulations of the parties in the 
presence of the Court are generally held to be binding, especially when acted upon or 
entered in the Court records. See: Kohringer v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 
1149, 1154 (2002). 
4 Amy objected to Bill's withdrawal of $150,000. Finding of Fact #50. Tr. p. 
571, L. 2 19. 
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since Crescent Rim had a deficit of capital of $16,000,000. R. 357, 
L. 5; R. 367, L. 9-18. The Trial Court found that the investments 
in Crescent Rim had dubious value. Findings of Fact #73, #75, and 
#83, Tr., p. 575-576. If the only activity in Account # ... 3713 at 
the date of marriage, when the balance was $386,636, were Bill's 
distributions of $250,000 5 , and the market loss of $136,837 from 
11/30/2000 to 12/31/2002,6 the IRA would have no value at all, and 
therefore, Bill was not entitled to claim the value on the date of 
marriage as his separate property. The Trial Court correctly 
determined that the balance in the account at trial was the result 
of community contributions and any separate property, if any 
remaining, was hopelessly commingled. 
Exhibit 235 analyzed Account 3713 since the date of marriage 
and revealed significant community contributions during marriage 
(Finding of Fact #45). R. 570. The Trial Court after listening to 
the testimony and analyzing the evidence determined that two of the 
contributions to the account in the amount of $150,000 and $15,869 
were roll-overs and the Court deducted said amounts from the total 
contributions of $373,182 shown on Exhibit 235, for total community 
contributions of $207,313. Footnote 1, page 11, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 571. The evidence showed community 
funds were commingled with separate funds in Schwab # ... 3713. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at R. 585-586. While the 
5 There were additional distributions including $15,869 and $75,000 in 2006, 
and $28,000 in 2009. See Exhibits 235 and Defendant's Exhibit 638. 
6 There were additional market losses in 2008. Ex. 235. 
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value fluctuated during marriage it is unclear what percentage of 
the decrease in value was a result of market conditions, versus 
withdrawals, and it was unclear, as the court found, what 
percentage of the withdrawals were for a community or separate 
purpose since Bill solely controlled the account. Id; Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 583 L. 26-27, R. 585. 
"Emblematic of Bill's course of dealing with the funds in 
the Schwab 3713 account is his testimony that "[In fall 
of 2008J I transferred, rolled over, $150,000 from my 
3713 IRA account at Schwab to Pens co Trust, Pens co Trust 
in turn invested that money in Meyer Clark, Meyer Clark 
Investments, in turn, made a $150,000 loan to Crescent 
Rim". This was only one of several transactions, a number 
of which are described in paragraphs 45-58 above [of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of LawJ through which 
Bill's movement of IRA funds, for the sole purpose of 
using them for his own investments, begins to take on the 
characteristics of a shell game." Id., Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. (Emphasis added). R. 585. 
Consequently, because Schwab Account # ... 3713 was commingled 
and the alleged separate assets were insufficiently traced, the 
entire account was community property. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 26. R. 586. As the District Court found, 
"the Magistrate's analysis of the circumstances surrounding Bill's 
I.R.A. and the community's funding of it, are supported by the 
evidence. Memorandum Decision and Order at page 7. R. 832. 
Veltex Income and Purchase of the Ketchum Condominium 
(Issue No.2) 
Bill's purported separate property claim in their Ketchum 
Condominium only arose for the first time two weeks before trial. 
R. 590, L. 10-11. 
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The Ketchum condominium was purchased during marriage on March 
28, 2007. Exhibit 6. Bill attempted to orally trace into the 
purchase of the Ketchum Condominium $107,146 of a sum of $342,149 
of monies he allegedly received as "income" in 2007 for work on the 
Veltex Condominium project. The condominium cost $975,000. Finding 
of Fact #14. The parties submitted checks at closing in the amount 
of $205,539.23. R. 564. Amy testified that the Ketchum Condominium 
was purchased in anticipation of paying down the initial loan with 
proceeds of sale of McCall properties owned by the parties jointly. 
Finding of Fact #13. Tr., p. 588, L. 3 - p. 589, L. 9. 
Bill testified, but yet he could not support, that the funds 
he received in 2007 for his work on the Veltex building project, 
started in 2002 and completed in 2004, was anything but income. 
The money received during the marriage in 2007 was presumed to be 
communi ty property and not his separate property. Banner Life 
Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 
117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). Amy testified that Bill was 
paid for his labor. Tr. p. 588. The District Court referred to the 
Record in footnote 3 as follows: 
"3 Amy testified that "Veltex was--the property site was 
owned by Veltex partners prior to my marriage to Bill. 
The actual planning and construction of the property 
occurred during the marriage. The construction occurred 
from 2003 and was completed in 2004. The sale that 
generated this amount of $342,149 occurred in 2007 ... And 
I believe that was due to the labor ... sweat equity that 
was put in during the time of our marriage. Trial 
Transcript, at 192, 588." Memorandum Decision and Order 
R. 837 
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The 2007 tax returns, Exhibit 73, did not report the money as a 
capital gain on Schedule 0, nor was it identified as such on form 
4797. Bill's testimony that it was a capital gain was not believed 
by the finder of fact. Tr., pages 650-661. Bill's testimony about 
Veltex, LLC was conflicting. Finding of Fact #16-19. He could not 
provide the date of the loan from Washington Trust Bank to build 
the condominiums. Finding of Fact #17. R. 565. He avoided in 
testimony the question regarding when construction was begun or 
completed. Finding of Fact #18. R. 565. Tr., p. 511 and 513. 
Exhibits 241 and 243 introduced by Amy established that 
construction occurred in 2002 through 2004. Bill's credibility 
suffered when he did not even recognize Exhibit 241 which was his 
own website, Tr. p. 512, L. 3-5, yet Exhibit 241, the Clark 
Development Veltex website, states that the building was completed 
in 2004. 
Bill received $342,149 from Veltex, LLC on February 7, 2007, 
but at that time he did not personally own the land the Veltex 
Building was built on, nor the building itself, rather he owned an 
interest in the entities that owned the property. R. 565. Bill had 
a history of being paid income to work on the projects in which he 
had an interest, and reported such as income. Tr., p. 514, L. 14 -
p. 515, L. 16. 
The funds received during marriage in February 2007 were 
presumpti vely community property, subj ect to proof by Bill that 
part or all of it was separate. Finding of Fact #24. R. 566. Bill 
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failed in his trace proof and that finding of fact is second-
guessed again in this appeal. 
The testimony established that the funds received from sales 
of the parties' McCall properties were used to reduce the Ketchum 
mortgage significantly. Tr., p. 588, L. 23 to p. 589, L. 9. 
Moreover, even if Bill could have established that $107,146 came 
from monies paid to him from Veltex, those funds were replaced by 
$284,000 of monies of McCall proceeds in accordance with the intent 
of the parties. Exhibit 232. 
III. 
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant failed to present any significant issue of law 
on appeal. No findings of fact made by the trial court were 
arguably unsupported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court 
has not been asked to establish any new legal standards or modify 
existing ones. As such, the appeal is without foundation. Huerta 
v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 17, 896 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Reed v. 
Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002). 
Moreover, this appeal is in essence an attack upon the 
findings of fact, already affirmed by the intermediate appellate 
court, with the District Court acting in that capacity. Yet, Bill 
has appealed again urging the same arguments but abandoning his 
claim that the Stone Point principal residence was all his separate 
property. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 12 
Attorneys fees are therefore proper under Idaho Code, Section 
12-121, Rule 54(e) (1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 41, 
Idaho Appellate Rules. Bill has not been dissuaded, all at great 
expense to Amy, but given the standard of review, affirming the 
District Court is a matter of procedure and attorneys fees should 





Standards of Review 
Effect of District Court Review. The District Court 
sitting in an appellate capacity applies the standards of review 
handed down by the Idaho Appellate Courts. However, given the 
decision in Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P. 3d 758 
(2008), the structure of the Idaho Appellate Rules now requires the 
Supreme Court to directly review the District Court's decision and 
consider whether the District Court committed error. The Supreme 
Court in a further appeal will then review the trial court record 
to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the Magistrate's Findings of Fact, and whether the 
Magistrate's Conclusions of Law follow those findings. If the 
findings are so supported and conclusions follow therefrom, and if 
the District Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision, then the 
Supreme Court will likewise affirm the District Court decision as 
a matter of procedure. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599, 601, 213 
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P.3d. 384 (2009); Losser, supra, citing Nichols v. Blaser, 102 
Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); State of Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 182 P.3d 1196 (2008); 
Harris v. Carter, 146 Idaho 22, 189 P.3d 484 (Ct. App. 2008). 
2. Review of Findings of Fact. The appellate court will not 
make credibility determinations or replace the trial court's 
factual findings by re-weighing the evidence. The evidence will be 
viewed in favor of the Magistrate's judgement and the Appellate 
Court will uphold the Magistrate's findings even if there is 
conflicting evidence. Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 204 p.3d 1140 
(2009) (emphasis added); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P.2d 
695 (1997). Findings of fact made by the trial court will not be 
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Rohr v. Rohr, 118 
Idaho 689, 800 P.2d 85 (1990). As the District Court stated (R. 
827), it is required to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Magistrate's findings of fact. Hentges v. 
Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a 
scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Clear Springs Foods, 
Inc. v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 136 Idaho 761, 764, 40 P.3d 119, 122 
(2002), R. 827. Deference must be given to the special opportunity 
of the trial court to assess and weigh the credibility of the 
witnesses who appear before it. Rohr v. Rohr, supra. On review from 
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the District Court acting as intermediate appellate court, the 
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals will not weigh the evidence, nor 
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial Judge. See 
Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 915 P.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1996). When 
the appellate court considers findings of fact made by the trial 
court, it will review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the party who prevailed at trial. Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho 900, 
136 P.3d 371 (C.A. 2006); Pieper v. Pieper, 1125 Idaho 667, 873 
P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The Magistrate found that the community value of Defendant's 
retirement account at Charles Schwab was based on the most credible 
evidence presented. Finding of Fact #10. R. 563. The District 
Court agreed at p. 7, Memorandum Decision and Order. R. 832. 
Where an intermediate appeal has occurred, only issues raised 
in the intermediate appeal may be brought forward to a higher 
appellate court. Harris v. Carter, 146 Idaho 22, 189 P.3d 484 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
The manner and method of acquisition of property, as well as 
the parties' treatment of that property, are questions of fact. 
[The Supreme Court] defer[s] to the magistrate's findings on these 
issues when they are supported by substantial evidence. Batra v. 
Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 391, 17 P.3d 889, 892 (ct. App. 2001). 
However, characterization of an asset as separate or community, in 
light of the facts found, is a question of law over which we 
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exercise free review. Batra v. Batra, supra (emphasis added), 
District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, at p. 2. R. 827. 
Where a magistrate has set out to achieve equality in a 
division of property, the division and divorce decree will not be 
disturbed on appeal if it appears through substantial, albeit 
conflicting, evidence that the parties have received substantially 
equal shares. When there is conflicting evidence regarding property 
division, it is the magistrate's task to evaluate the credibility 
of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence presented. Batra v. 
Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 398, 17 P.3d 889, 899 (Ct. App. 2001), 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, R. 828. 
The determination of "community" value is within the 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal 
if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Stewart v. 
Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007); Chandler v. Chandler, 
136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001). 
3. Trial Court Discretion. The discretionary decisions of 
the trial court will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial 
court abused its discretion. A Trial Court's disposition of 
community property is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Chandler 
v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001). A review for abuse 
of discretion means: 
" ... (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
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consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902, 950 P.2d 
1237, 1241 (1997); Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 817 
P.2d 160 (1991); Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "individual cases will 
have to be largely decided on their facts" and that "it is better 
policy to allow the trial court sufficient discretion to consider 
the circumstances in each case to determine the most equitable 
manner for determining and dividing the marital portion of pension 
benefits". District Court's Memorandum and Decision, R. 835, 
citing Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 91, 822 P.2d 982, 998 
(1991) . 
4. Conclusions of Law. The Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals will review freely conclusions of law reached, by stating 
legal rules or principles and applying them to facts found. State 
v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000); 
Liebelt v. Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845, 801 p.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1990). If 
the law has been properly applied to the facts as found, the 
judgment will be upheld on appeal. Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 
Idaho 731, 963 P.2d 1168 (1998). 
In this case, given the preponderance of the evidence, 
and burden of proof and persuasion, the Trial Court's findings were 
supported by substantial evidence and the Trial Court did not abuse 
its discretion. The District Court, after careful review, agreed. 
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Additionally, the trial court found Amy's testimony credible, but 
the same cannot be said for Bill Clark, whose credibility problems 
plagued him throughout the trial. Examples can be found in 
Findings of Fact #16, #18, #29, #50, #54, and #96; R. 585, L. 24; 
R. 587, L. 20-24. 
It is unfortunate that Appellant fails to cite to 
Exhibits and the Record which supports the Trial Court's findings 
of fact, so that the Court can determine how it is the Trial Court 
made and supported its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
instead of just re-stating his version of the facts again.7 
B. 
The District Court Did Not Error In Affirming The 
Magistrate's Finding That The Value Of Appellant's 
Charles Schwab SEP!IRA # .. . 3713 Was Community Property 
Appellant's claim concerning his SEP!IRA was deceptively 
simple and inherently unfair. He claimed that since the value on 
the date of marriage of $386,636 exceeded the balance at the date 
of divorce of $353,873, that all of the account was his sole and 
separate property. That view ignores the fact that the account in 
2002 because of market fluctuations dropped down to $249,799 
(Exhibit 235) and dropped again thereafter; that Bill removed funds 
in excess of $250,000 from the account during marriage (Exhibits 
7 For example, Appellant states as "fact" in the course of proceedings Section 
of his brief, at page 5, that the magistrate found that the distribution Bill received 
was a "capital gain", which he attempted to trace into purchase of the Ketchum Condo., 
but the Court found it was not a capital gain, but income. District Court Memorandum 
Decision and Order at p. 13. R. 838. The Trial Court did not believe Bill's 
testimony that it was capital gain. Tr. p. 655, L. 12 to p. 656, L. 10; Tr., p. 660, 
L. 16 to p. 661, L. 2. 
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235 and 638); and that community contributions in the sum of 
$207,313 were added to the account during the marriage. (Exhibit 
235, Footnote 1, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 571. 
Account # ... 3713 became hopelessly commingled as the Court so 
found. 8 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 23-26 cited by 
the District Court at p. 5-6 of the Memorandum Decision and Order. 
R. 830-831. 
Appellant cited Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 822 P.2d 982 
(1991) to the Magistrate and District Court for the proposition 
that the Court should simply subtract the value on the date of 
marriage from the value at divorce to arrive at the community value 
today. The Supreme Court in Maslen recognized that such a 
simplistic view would not always apply and in affirming the 
Magistrate here the District Court quoted the most applicable part 
of Maslen: 
"Because the provisions of retirement plans vary so 
greatly from plan to plan, both in the manner of funding 
and also in the administration of the plans, and because 
the circumstances in each case are so varied we decline 
to state a single inflexible rule for calculating the 
communi ty interest or value of retirement plans .... it 
appears to us to be impractical-if not impossible-to 
formulate a categorical rule about the appropriate 
treatment of retirement accounts in dissolution of 
marriage cases. We conclude that it is a better policy to 
allow the trial court sufficient discretion to consider 
the circumstances in each case to determine the most 
8 During marriage Bill transferred out $250,000 to Pens co Trust and Sterling 
Trust which lost nearly all of its value. Exhibit 74A, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 46 and 48. R. 570-571. Amy objected to a $150,000 withdrawal in 
2008 but Bill did it anyway. Finding of Fact #50. R. 571. 
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equitable manner for determining and dividing the marital 
portion of pension benefits." Maslen v. Maslen, supra, 
District Court Memorandum Decision and order at p. 7, R. 
832. 
The District Court in affirming the Magistrate explained as 
follows: 
"The circumstances of this case, concerning the 
utilization of the couple's IRAs, are also different than 
those in McCoy v. McCoy, in which no withdrawals were 
made from the IRA accounts. The magistrate's analysis of 
the circumstances surrounding Bill's IRA and the 
community's funding of it, are supported by the evidence. 
As noted by the magistrate, while Bill initially had a 
balance of $386,636.18, the community provided some 
$200,000 of contributions to it during the marriage, 
while Bill was making withdrawals from the account to 
finance his business ventures. Due to the lack of 
accounting, it cannot be determined to what extent the 
reduction in value in the account was due to market 
forces or the withdrawals. In any event, the magistrate 
did not abuse his discretion in determining that the most 
equitable solution was to divide Bill's IRA equally, 
since his IRA, which began as consisting of only his 
separate property, was commingled with community 
property." R. 832-833. 
The simple subtraction method was appropriate to one plan in Maslen 
in part because the plan increased in value during marriage, in 
that United Airlines (Mr. Maslen's employer) contributed 9% of his 
monthly salary to the retirement account. Mr. Maslen was not 
asserting that the growth in his retirement plan was separate 
property, rather he was asking the court to apply a time rule 
calculation to the entire plan. Appellant cites here and to the 
District Court the case of McCoy v. McCoy, 125 Idaho 199, 868 P.2d 
527 (Ct. App. 1994) which utilized the subtraction method. Like Mr. 
Maslen's retirement plan, Judy McCoy's IRA's and 401(k) grew during 
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the marriage and the increase was determined to be community 
property. McCoy, supra, at 205. Here, Bill Clark's SEP/IRA 
decreased during the marriage. The Court in McCoy also stated "no 
evidence was presented to show that Judy or Clinton withdrew any 
funds from the retirement account during the marriage .. . If. Supra, 
at 205. Yet here, during the marriage Bill Clark took withdrawals 
and moved the monies from Schwab # ... 3713 in the sum of $301,975 
(Exhibit 235) "to finance his business ventures". R. 832. Bill then 
as ked the Trial Court to confirm the entire account balance of 
$353,873 as his separate property and the Court could not legally 
ignore said distributions as well as the contributions during the 
marriage in the amount of $207,313. 
When separate property and community amounts exist in an 
account, commingling will convert the separate property portion to 
community property unless the separate property can be identified 
and properly traced. Barton v. Barton, 132 Idaho 394, 973 P.2d 746 
(1999); Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Appellant's tracing of the separate property component must be 
established wi th "reasonable certainty and particulari ty". Worzala 
v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996); Houska v. Houska, 
95 Idaho 568, 512 P.2d 1317 (1973). Bill failed to provide such 
proof. Before the trial, the parties asked the Court to address 
pre-trial Mr. Clark's attempt to compare the balance today to the 
balance on the date of marriage and if the amount were less, 
whether factually and legally the court would be compelled to 
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conclude that it was all separate property. On January 27, 2010, 
prior to trial, the court properly ruled that it would come down to 
a matter of proof. Yet, at trial Appellant did not even attempt to 
trace, either directly or indirectly, with reasonable certainty and 
particularity. Josephson v. Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 
1236 (Ct. App. 1989). Such trace was impossible due to lack of 
accounting evidence from Bill. R. 832. Because Bill Clark did not 
trace with reasonable certainty and particularity the $386,636 in 
existence one day before marriage to the stock, bonds, and cash in 
the account now, he failed to rebut the community presumption. In 
addition he did not attempt to identify community contributions, 
additions, interest, dividends, and natural enhancement on the same 
as part of a trace. During the marriage funds were added and funds 
moved in and out of the account and what was there at trial was 
clearly not what was there on the date of marriage. A review of 
Bill Clark's SEP/IRA shows that it dropped in value from $386,636 
on November 30, 2000 (Exhibit 235) to $249,799 at the end of 2002 
(Exhibit 235). The account suffered an additional drop in value 
because of the market correction in 2008. Apart from additions and 
withdrawals which Appellant ignored, in essence Bill Clark sought 
to make the community a guarantor and pay him back for the drop in 
value by a windfall award at trial of the value he had on the date 
of marriage, while his removal of funds to invest in his projects 
were all but lost in their entirety. The value consisted of 
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investments made from additions and interest , dividends, plus 
appreciation and minus market loss on the same, all of which was 
community property during the marriage. Mr. Clark did not attempt 
to trace because he could not trace with reasonable certainty and 
particularity in commingled account # ... 3713. 
The Trial Court found and the District Court affirmed the 
following: 
"There is no question, based on the significant community 
contributions thereto, that the community has an interest 
in the Schwab 3713 account. From the date of marriage, 
and every year thereafter, the community invested into 
the account in varying amounts, totaling over $200,000. 
There was no evidence to suggest a finding other than 
that Bill had sole control over the withdrawal of money 
from the IRA [and that] ... significant community funds 
were commingled with separate funds". Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. R. 583, 585, 586. 
The Magistrate and District Court addressed and rejected 
Appellant's argument below that the characterization and 
distribution of the IRA was controlled by Maslen v. Maslen, 121 
Idaho 85, 822 P.2d 982 (1991) and McCoy v. McCoy, 125 Idaho 199, 
868 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1994). Neither case controlled because the 
IRA was a savings account and the time rule does not apply to a 
savings account. It was clear that "Bill's treatment of the 
account during marriage is more analogous to a savings account, or 
perhaps more accurately, a business capital or investment account, 
than a retirement account." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, page 25. R. 585. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 23 
"It is noteworthy that in neither Maslen or McCoy was 
there evidence that withdrawals were made from the 
accounts during the course of the marriage. The 
circumstances in this case are factually distinguishable 
from either above cited cases, and suggest a different 
analysis for determining the character and distribution 
of the Schwab 3713 account." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R., 585. 
The Court found that significant community funds were 
commingled with separate funds in Account # ... 3713. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 585. That finding was 
inescapable. 
Additionally, the Trial Court found that "Bill's course of 
dealing in Schwab 3713 took on the characteristics of a shell 
game" . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 585. At trial 
Bill was confused about his own shell game, Tr., p. 432, L. 5-15, 
al though he knowingly transferred money from 3713 over Amy's 
objection. Tr., p. 440, L.5-19 and p. 468, L. 2-21. There were 
numerous transfers between 3713, Pensco Trust, and Sterling Trust 
(Tr., p. 483, L. 9-18), all done to funnel funds out and into his 
investments. Tr., p. 664, L. 4-12. Because of the shell game, 
Appellant had failed to provide the Court with a basis to trace any 
funds within the IRA "as Bill's separate property with a reasonable 
certainty and particularity". Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. R. 585-586. Because the standard of proof is so high, and the 
trace proof totally lacking or much less even attempted at trial, 
the second guessing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
regarding Schwab 3713 is unreasonable in the words of Huerta v. 
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Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 896 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1995) and Reed v. 
Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002). The Appellate Court must 
view the evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent since Amy 
prevailed at trial on this issue. Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho 900, 
136 P.3d 371 (Ct. App. 2006). 
"Consequently, because it is commingled and 
assets are insufficiently traced, the entire 
amount of Schwab 3713 is deemed to be 
community and will be divided equally." 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 
586. 
A tangential issue raised on appeal, and not properly an issue 
for appeal to the District Court or this Court, is the claim that 
the Magistrate erred in its decision that if the entirety of Bill's 
IRA was community property, then Dr. Baruch's account should be 
"characterized in the same manner". Appellant conceded Amy's 
separate property interest of $74,777 in her IRA as a matter of 
tactics, so Bill could argue Schwab 3713 was all his separate 
property. Tr., p. 662, L. 16-18. Mr. Welsh said, "Judge, all I'm 
saying is that we argued that both of their balances as of the date 
of marriage was separate property." Tr., p. 662, L. 16-18. At 
the Motion to Amend, Mr. Welsh tried to argue he did not concede 
her separate property portion yet he clearly did. Tr. p., 672, L. 
7-11. A party may not obtain reversal on appeal for an alleged 
error that was invited by that party in the trial Court. Having 
conceded her separate property interest in her IRA (item 32 on the 
property and debt schedule), Bill cannot appeal this issue, just 
like he could not have appealed from a stipulation. Ratliff v. 
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Ratliff, 129 Idaho 422 (1996); Smith v. Smith, 136 Idaho 120, 29 
P.3d 956 (Ct. App. 2001). Bill's counsel's concession was a matter 
of tactics but was binding. Moreover, this argument was not raised 
in the lower court and was only raised post trial and cannot be the 
subject of an appeal. See Smith v. Smith, 136 Idaho 120, 123, 29 
P.3d 956 (Ct. App. 2001). In Bill's Post Trial Brief he conceded 
(R. 270) that Amy's $74,777 in item 32 on the property and debt 
schedule (her Schwab Account # ... 5317) was her "separate property". 
At the hearing on the Motion to Alter or Amend, Defendant stated 
that the balance in Amy's IRA before marriage was her separate 
property, and that the court should on that basis change its 
decision with reference to Bill's IRA. Tr., p. 662, L.16-18. 
The District Court referred to a different I. R. A. when it 
quoted testimony at page 834. 9 The Trial Court was not referring 
to item 27A, but item 32 and properly treated, however, the 
separate property in Amy's Schwab IRA (Acct. # ... 5317) different 
than Bill's Schwab IRA (Acct. # ... 3713) because the parties treated 
them "completely different". Tr. p. 662, L. 22 to page 663, L. 5. 
Amy withdrew nothing from hers but she added to her IRA of which 
Bill got the benefit. "On the other hand, [Bill] used his a little 
bit like his wallet in terms of moving money out, making other 
9 The District Court committed a minor and harmless error 
when it referred to a passage from Bill's testimony where he 
conceded a Wells Fargo I.R.A. in the amount of $3,361. This is a 
different IRA than Amy's Schwab IRA # ... 5317, which is the one 
Mr. Welsh conceded was separate property to the extent of 
$74,777. 
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investments." Tr., p. 663, L. 10-12. The $150,000 of monies Bill 
withdrew from # ... 3713 in violation of the TRO, funneled through 
Pensco to Crescent Rim, was all lost. Tr. p. 367, L. 9-18. As 
Bill's accountant testified the IRA invested in Crescent Rim is "so 
far underwater to assign a value to it". Id. The $100,000 funneled 
into Pearson Partners was only worth $37,212 and was assigned to 
Bill. R. 593. 
Appellant claims that he "never took any distributions from 
his IRA", however Bill's testimony and Bill's Exhibit 638 establish 
facts to the contrary: 
BILL CLARK: "My recollection is that it was around 
probably 1994, '95. I transferred funds from my Schwab 
IRA 3713 to Pensco Trust for an initial investment of 
$30,000 -no excuse me. I'm confusing it with the one 
below, Sterling Trust. Pensco. It would have been it 
was around 2005, and transferred $100,000 into it from my 
3713 IRA for purposes of investing having the IRA 
through Pensco invest in the purchase of the land and 
providing initial capital for the Pearson Partners, LLC." 
Tr., p. 432, L. 5-15. 
WELSH: " .. . In 2005 did you take from one IRA to another 
IRA of $100,000 other than to Pensco? Was that the only-
BILL CLARK: I would have to look at the specific 3713 
account. But at some point I believe it was later than 
2005 we invested $100,000 into Sterling Trust Company." 
Tr., p. 436, L. 24 - p. 437, L. 2. 
BILL CLARK: "I transferred, rolled over, $150,000 from my 
3713 IRA account at Schwab to Pens co Trust, and Pens co 
Trust in turn invested that money in Meyer Clark, 
$150,000, in Meyer Clark Investments. Meyer Clark 
Investments in turn made a $150,000 loan to Crescent 
Rim". Tr., p. 439, L. 7-12. 
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Defendant's Exhibit 638 shows the following amounts in the 
column "Distribution or Rollover": 
$100,000 in 2005 
$15,869 and $75,000 in 2006, 
$1,495 in 2007, 
$150,000 in 2008 (without counting the $150,000 
that came out twice but went back in twice), and 
$150,000, $28,000 and $6,611 in 2009. 
Bill Clark was very confused about all such transfers and 
lacked believability, as the following passage at Tr., p. 448, L. 
7-21 shows: 
WELSH: How was your investment in Sterling created? 
BILL CLARK: It was through a transfer of funds from my 
3713 IRA account to Sterling investments who in turn--
the original investment was $ 30,000, I believe. And it 
was made--in turn made the investment in Alpha Lending, 
LLC, which is a Boise-based real estate lending company. 
I realize, as I was looking at this, I have to correct a 
statement I made a little bit ago. I got confused. I 
said a little bit ago that I had transferred $150,000 
from my 3713 IRA to Pensco for purposes of the Meyer 
Clark investment. What I actually did was invest--
transferred $ 50,000 to--excuse me. I take all that back." 
Tr., p. 448, L. 7-21. 
On appeal to the District Court, Appellant sought to distinguish 
between the word "rollover" and the word "distribution". Now on 
this appeal, regardless of semantics, the above monies were 
deducted and came out of account from the balance of Schwab IRA 
# ... 3713, which account was used like a shell game. R. 585. The 
District Court soundly rejected the semantics game. 
"The defendant contends that the magistrate's conclusion 
that Bill withdrew funds during the marriage from the IRA 
is not supported by the evidence. All of the evidence 
presented established that Bill never took any 
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distributions from his IRAs. The evidence presented 
showed that he rolled over funds and transferred funds 
amongst the three retirement accounts only". Appellant's 
Brief, at 13-14. This assertion is simply not accurate. 
For example, Bill testified during the trial that he used 
$150,000 from this IRA to provide additional funding for 
his Crescent Rim condominium project. Seer e.g' r Trial 
Transcript, at 439-40 ("I transferred, rolled over, 
$150,000 from my 3713 IRA account at Schwab to Pens co 
Trust, and my Pensco Trust in turn invested that money in 
Meyer Clark, $150,000 in Meyer Clark Investments, Meyer 
Clark Investments in turn made a $150,000 loan to 
Crescent Rim ... And then I decided to use funds from the 
IRA, my 3713 IRA, as I just described. That's how it got 
to Meyer Clark into Crescent Rim.") See also id. r at 473 
("So there was a transfer from the 3713 IRA account to 
Pens co . And Pens co then put those funds into Pearson 
Partners for purposes of buying down the loan.") Al though 
technically the transfers were not made directly to Bill, 
the magistrate was correct in finding that they were 
effectively just that." R. 833. 
It appears bold, greedy and litigious that Bill would still 
seek on this appeal to have all of his IRA treated as separate 
property, when the funds were withdrawn and virtually all lost in 
Bill's failed business ventures, and seek one-half of Amy's IRA 
too! Such an approach is consistent and why Bill Clark suffered 
from his inequitable positions. 
The Court correctly perceived that its division of community 
property was a discretionary determination. Tr. p. 677, L. 11-14; 
Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001); Stewart v. 
Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007) In terms of Maslen, 
supra, that Supreme Court realized contrary to Appellant's view of 
Maslen, that one treatment of retirement accounts was not logical 
for all cases. There are different ways in treating retirement 
accounts based on the circumstances that exist (Tr. p. 677, L. 19 
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to page 678, L. 1) and that is why the Court exercised proper 
discretion when it stated: 
"Applying the analysis approved in Maslen and McCoy, 
would result in ignoring the entirety of the community's 
contributions to the account and produce a result that is 
unfair to the community. " Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R. 586. 
In fact the message of Maslen is what Judge Reardon and the 
District Court thought it to be: 
"Because the provisions of retirement plans vary so 
greatly from plan to plan, both in the manner of funding 
and also in the administration of the plans, and because 
the circumstances in each case are so varied we decline 
to state a single inflexible rule for calculating the 
community interest or value of retirement plans." 
"Because there are so many variables, individual cases 
will have to be largely decided on their facts. We 
conclude that it is a better policy to allow the trial 
court sufficient discretion to consider the circumstances 
in each case to determine the most equitable manner for 
determining and dividing the marital portion of 
retirement benefits. Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 91, 
822 P.2d 982 (1991). 
On page 13 of Appellant's Brief, he ignores the foregoing 
statement of the law and urges here a "one size fits all" approach 
to both IRAs in this case, which the lower court and the District 
Court wisely rejected. 
The court acted well within the outer bounds of discretion and 
reached its result through reason. Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 
494, 817 p.2d 160 (1991); Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 
P.3d 140 (2001). 
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The best example of proper discretion in action is the 
following passage from the hearing on Appellant's Motion to Alter 
or Amend: 
"We have different ways of treating retirement accounts 
based upon the circumstances that exist. And my findings 
were based upon my belief that the circumstances with 
which Mr. Clark treated his retirement account during the 
course of the marriage were significantly different than 
the way Dr. Baruch treated her retirement account during 
the course of the marriage. And it was those differences 
that made up the basis for my finding that the 
distribution should be as I set forth. And I can't think 
of a reason, based on what we have talked about here 
today, to change that. So I'll deny the motion to alter 
or amend with respect to that point." Tr., p. 677, L. 
24 through p. 678, L. 12. 
C. 
The District Court Did Not Error In Affirming The 
Magistrate's Finding That Bill Received Income That Was 
Community Property And That Appellant 
Failed to Trace Separate Property Into the Ketchum Condominium 
The value, debt and allocation of the Ketchum condominium was 
stipulated to by the parties. The condominium cost $975,000. R. 
564. The parties agreed that at the time of trial the condominium 
was valued at $725,000, with liens in the amount of $372,788. It 
was agreed that Amy would keep the condominium with equity of 
$352,211. At trial, Bill sought reimbursement for separate funds 
he alleged were expended in acquiring the condominium. Finding of 
Fact #11. R. 564. 10 Bill testified that the separate funds invested 
10 Although not before this Court, the dollar for dollar separate property 
reimbursement rule of Os tick v. Ostick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983) 
appears inequitable when the property declined in value by $250,000. Why should the 
separate property receive such a guaranty when a community reimbursement claim is not 
treated that way? The community reimbursement rule in Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 
142, 645 P.2d 882 (1982) is more logical and fair. 
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in the Ketchum Condominium were proceeds from the sale of the 
Ve 1 tex Building, which funds he received on February 7, 2007, 
subsequent to the sale of his interest in that development. Yet 
the Court did not accept that testimony, in part because Amy 
testified that the Ketchum Condominium was purchased In 
anticipation of paying down the initial loan with proceeds of the 
sale of the McCall properties which the parties owned jointly, and 
from which she should have been reimbursed for her separate 
property contribution in acquiring a McCall Cabin. Finding of Fact 
#13. R. 564. Tr., p. 193, L. 2-21; Tr. p. 588, L. 3-13. Bill and 
Amy purchased the Ketchum Condominium March 28, 2007, for $975,000. 
At closing, the parties submitted checks in the amounts of $30,000 
and $175,539.23 as a down payment. Tr. p. 190, L. 24 - p. 191, L. 
13; Exhibits 6 and 232. 
Bill was engaged in development business through the auspices 
of variously named business entities. Two such entities were 
Vel tex Building, LLC, formed to acquire the site on which the 
Veltex Building would be built, and BED Investments, LLC, formed to 
engage in the development and building of the Veltex building, a 
residential and office condominium complex. Finding of Fact #15. 
R. 564. However, Bill provided conflicting evidence and testimony 
regarding the timing of his acquisition of an interest in BED 
Investments and Veltex LLC. At trial, Bill's testimony was that 
BED Investments was a partner in Veltex at its inception, and that 
he acquired an interest in BED Investments at the same time it 
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acquired an interest in Veltex. R. 565, L. 1-9. Bill also testified 
that these two events occurred in 1997. R. 565, L.6. Exhibit 517 
establishes that Veltex LLC was not established until October 29, 
1998, and Exhibit 517 establishes that BED Investments was not 
formed until January 22, 1999. Finding of Fact #16. R. 565. 
Bill testified that the construction of the Veltex building 
was financed through a loan from Washington Trust Bank to Veltex 
LLC, but did not provide a date on which the loan was procured. 
Finding of Fact #17; R., 565, Tr., p. 412, L. 7-25. Nor did Bill 
provide proof who signed the loan. Bill also testified that the 
planning for the Veltex building was done prior to marriage, but 
avoided the question regarding when construction was begun or 
completed. Finding of Fact #18. R. 565. On cross examination after 
shown Exhibit 241, Bill conceded construction began in the fall of 
2002. Tr., p. 512, L. 23 to p. 513, L. 11. Bill first received 
$260,800, paid by BED Investments in October 2005 and deposited by 
Bill into Schwab # ... 3714, a community account. BED Investments 
was dissolved in April 2008. Exhibit 516. The next payment to 
Bill about which there was evidence, was in the amount of $342,149 
paid by Veltex LLC, and deposited by Bill into the Schwab # ... 3714 
community account on February 7th, 2007. Yet, at the time of 
marriage, and at the time he received the distributions referred to 
above, Bill personally owned neither the land the Veltex building 
was built on, nor the building itself, rather owned an interest in 
the entities which owned the property. Findings of Fact, #21-22. 
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R. 565. Bill did not relinquish any percentage of his shares in 
either BED Investments or Veltex LLC in exchange for the 
distributions he received. Finding of Fact #23. R. 566. 
Accordingly, since both sums were received by Bill during 
marriage they were presumed to be community property, subject to 
proof by Bill that part or all of the funds received were separate. 
Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 
147 Idaho 117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). Finding of Fact #24. 
While Bill testified that "all the planning" on the Veltex building 
project was done prior to marriage, the Court properly found it 
more likely than not, given the fact that ground was not broken on 
the project until sometime after September of 2002 (Exhibit 243) 
and not completed until 2004 (Exhibit 241), that significant 
community effort was expended on the project by Bill. Finding of 
Fact #25. R. 566; Exhibit 241. 
At the hearing to alter or amend, the Court explained again to 
Appellant's counsel what the Court found to be true: 
"Well, my perspective on it was that based 
upon the timing, Mr. Clark had his share in 
Veltex at the time they were married, and at 
the time that he received this, what you 
characterized as capital gains and I'm viewing 
it as income, was about seven years after the 
marriage." Tr. p. 655, L. 12 17. 
In Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend, Bill's counsel could not 
convince the trial court that the monies he received for developing 
the Vel tex proj ect were something other than community income. 
Bill had failed to carry his burden to overcome the community 
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presumption, since the funds were received during the marriage. 
Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 
supra; Reed v. Reed, supra; Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 
411 (1983). Bill failed to trace his so-called separate proceeds 
with reasonable certainty and particularity. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 22. 
The Court ruled: 
" ... my finding was based upon my determination that it 
was more probable than not that Mr. Clark put a 
significant amount of effort into this project in the 
planning, building and selling of units after they were 
married. And that the compensation that was received in 
2007 that has been characterized as capital gains was 
income because he didn't give anything up in exchange for 
that." Tr. p. 655, L. 24, through p. 656, L. 7. 
The Court was well aware of Mr. Clark's credibility problem on 
this issue as well. Bill testified under oath that all planning on 
the Veltex building occurred before marriage, (Tr., p. 413, L. 4-6) 
but given the fact that ground was not broken until September 2002 
(Tr., p. 513, L. 9-11; Exhibit 243), and not completed until 2004 
(Tr., p. 573, L. 22-24), his testimony was not believable and the 
Court so concluded. Finding of Fact #25 (R. 566); Exhibit 241. Amy 
testified that the Veltex Building was planned and developed during 
the marriage, "and the proceeds that he lists there, $ 342,149, 
occurred during the time of marriage, and I believe that was due to 
the labor ... the sweat equity that was put in during the time of our 
marriage". Tr. p. 588, L. 7-22. 
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Bill received income in 2007 for work on the Veltex project. 
Tr. p. 660, L. 3-10. The Court properly concluded: 
"I think based on the evidence that I heard, that it is 
more likely than not that the gain that they realized in 
2007 was a result of community effort, and it's income." 
Tr., p. 660, L. 3-7. 
That further, the Court stated: 
"I mean, my view of the evidence was that, taken as a 
whole the evidence about when Vel tex and Mr. Clark's 
confusion about when he formed BED Investments and when 
he formed Veltex, and his testimony about when the 
developments started and more credible proof that I 
received about when it actually started, all of that for 
me added up to a finding it was more likely than not that 
all the effort was put into the Ve1tex building that 
resulted in income being distributed seven years later 
was income." Tr., p. 660, L17, through p. 661, L. 2. 
Exhibits 241 and 243. 
A more classic example of the proper weighing of evidence, applying 
the preponderance of evidence standard, assessing credibility, and 
exercising reason well within the bounds of discretion would be 
hard to find. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673,152 P.3d 544 
(2007); Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001). 
The Appellate Court must decline Appellant's invitation to second 
guess the fact finder. The Supreme Court does not re-weigh the 
evidence nor does it substitute its view of the facts for that of 
the trial judge, even if there is conflicting evidence in the 
record. Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 509, 915 P.2d 733 (Ct. 
App. 1996. 
Appellant's attempt to trace said funds into the purchase of 
the Ketchum Condominium also failed at the starting point and 
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Appellant was not entitled to a reimbursement claim in the Ketchum 
Condominium. Appellant concedes that the balance in Schwab Account 
Number # . .. 3714 of $195,024.51 on February 9, 2007 was community 
property. (Appellant's Brief to the District Court, R. 729; 
Appellant's Brief to the Supreme Court, p. 27). Appellant conceded 
that the down payment of $30,000 came from a community property 
source. (Appellant's Brief, R. 729). Thereafter, the deposit of 
Veltex income received during the marriage in the sum of $342,149 
was also community property and was presumed as such. Reed v. Reed, 
137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002); Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 
P.2d 411 (1983). As the parties testified and which was further 
supported by Exhibits, ground was broken on the Veltex Building 
sometime after September 16, 2002, approximately 22 months after 
the parties were married, and developed with Bill's community 
industry and on the community clock. Veltex construction was 
finished in 2004. (Exhibit 241). The Veltex Building was planned, 
developed and constructed during the marriage which was 
corroborated through impeachment of Bill's testimony. Tr. p. 588, 
L. 19-22. Appellant did not meet his burden of proof and persuasion 
because he did not trace with reasonable certainty and 
particularity that any of his alleged separate funds comprised the 
$205,539 ($30,000+$175,539, Exhibit 232, Bates page 2374) paid by 
the parties at the closing to purchase the Ketchum Condominium. 
Bill Clark failed to trace his alleged separate property with 
"reasonable certainty and particularityu. Worzala v. Worzala, 128 
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Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996); Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 
512 P.2d 1317 (1973) Plaintiff's Exhibit 232 was persuasive. 
Exhibit 232 outlined the flow of monies in and out of Account 
# ... 3714, Bill's working capital account. The Ketchum down payment 
of $205,539 was replenished from part of the proceeds from the sale 
of McCall properties totaling $684,211 on 5/17/2007 and 9/11 2007. 
Meanwhile Bill had paid out $333,391 of funds from # ... 3714 from 
2/9/07 through 12/5/2007 unrelated to the Ketchum Condo. It 
appears that Bill would have difficulty running his business as 
usual if significant funds had not been returned to Account 
# ... 3714. Exhibit 232. In short, the supposed Veltex proceeds had 
been replenished to Bill's account. 
On appeal, Appellant stated that the "Magistrate Court 
ini tially concluded as set forth in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, "that capital gains earned on separate property 
is income". (Appellant's Brief, p. 19). The Court actually stated, 
"this presumption appears to be based on his belief that capital 
gains from a separate asset during marriage are separate property, 
a proposition that the court can find no support. R. 582. The 
statement was harmless error and the District Court recognized that 
the Magistrate corrected the statement at the post trial hearing, 
namely, "that capital gains from a separate asset received during 
marriage are not always separate property". R. 838. Appellant 
appears to have created the problem in part with an improper 
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"capital gain" label--a tax concept.ll The rule that applies is 
about natural appreciation as stated by the District Court: 
"As a general rule, the natural enhancement in value of 
separate property during coverture [marriage] does not 
constitute community property; however, to the extent an 
enhancement in value is due to the community efforts, 
labor, industry of funds, it falls into the community". 
Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 127, 525 P.2d 314, 322 
(1974) . 
Similarly, proceeds from the sale of a separate asset can be 
part separate, part community. Within proceeds a commingling issue 
can arise, which if not traced with reasonable certainty and 
particularity will all become community. Worzala v. Worzala, 128 
Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 122 Idaho 
634, 836 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1992). Income derived from Bill's 
labor and industry during the marriage is community. "The income, 
including rents, issues and profits of all property, separate or 
community, is community property .. . ff. Idaho Code, Section 32-
906(1). Finally, since the $342,179 of income was received during 
the marriage in 2007 it is presumed to be community property. 
Banner Life Insurance Company v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable 
Trust, supra. This was a proper fact finding issue for the trial 
court and the court's finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
The Magistrate's initial statement at R. 582 about capital 
gains did not effect the logic and appropriateness of the court's 
conclusion. The bottom line finding and conclusion was: 
11 The term capital gains is a confusing term. Proceeds from the sale of an 
asset can have separate and community components. Community labor could have caused 
the proceeds and distribution may have commingling issues. But here, the money Bill 
received was income, not capital gains. 
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"The Veltex Building was built and developed during the 
marriage and the proceeds from the Veltex Building and 
income are presumed to be community property and 
Defendant [Appellant here] failed to overcome the 
community presumption. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion 
regarding the purchase of the Ketchum Condominium is 
Denied." Judgment and Order Re: Motion to Alter or Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. R. 
680-681. 
The reason the Court arrived at its conclusion is that income 
from separate property is community. Idaho Code, Section 32-906. 
The Court found: 
"[G]iven that the funds were received during marriage, 
the Court begins with the presumption that they are 
communi ty property. It then becomes Bill's burden to 
trace the origin of the funds "with reasonable certainty" 
to a separate source. The source in this case was Veltex 
Building LLC, not the actual property itself. Bill did 
not own the property at the time of marriage, but rather 
an interest in the entity that did own it. He did not 
receive the funds as a result of a liquidation of that 
interest, and in fact he still owns the same percentage 
of the LLC that he did at the time of marriage. His 
asset is preserved in its entirety. There is no evidence 
that the asset, the LLC, increased in value naturally, or 
that the funds he received were as a result of that 
natural enhancement. Given those circumstances, funds 
received through the asset must be regarded as income. 
Income from separate property, received during the 
marriage, is community property. I.C. §32-906." R. 582. 
Again, the Court found the facts based on the evidence, and despite 
all of Appellant's second guessing, by way of motion to amend the 
Court ruled: 
"With respect to the findings that the proceeds from the 
Veltex building were community property in 2007, I can't 
find a reason to change that as well. We are talking 
about a period of time that was seven years post 
marriage. And my findings - I mean, we start with the 
presumption that the income received is community income. 
And it seems to me that I have to have something that 
demonstrates clearly and convincingly that it was 
separate property. The only finding that I can make, 
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based upon the evidence that I heard, was that this far 
into the marriage, given the state of the project at the 
time of the marriage and the amount of effort that I 
found that he put into during the marriage, that there is 
nothing that overcomes the presumption that its community 
income. And so I never got to a trace. And for that 
reason, I'm going to deny the motion to reconsider on 
that point." Tr., p. 678, L. 13 through p. 679, L. 6. 
Not only does Appellant's tracing theory fail at the starting 
point, but Appellant's analysis of Schwab Account # ... 3714 was 
inaccurate. Exhibit 596 contains the Schwab statements for the 
period February and March 2007. Appellant's analysis fails to take 
into account the $1,631. 60 in community dividends and interest 
added to the Schwab account in February (Exhibit 596, pages 1283 
and 1284) and the $1,943.23 in community dividends and interest 
added to the account in March (Exhibit 596, page 1294). Further, 
in the table on page 24 of Appellant's Brief (R. 729), Bill 
subtracts a $10,000 check from community property "CP", allegedly 
on March 26, 2007, before he accounts for the check in the amount 
of $176,000 to close the purchase of Ketchum, when in fact the 
$10,000 check was withdrawn on March ZQ, 2007, after the $176,000 
check cleared. (Exhibit 596, page 1293). Bates page 1307 in Exhibit 
596 shows that said $10,000 check was payable to William Clark and 
was paid on March 28, 2007. Hypothetically, even if Bill had traced 
the Veltex funds to proceeds of his separate property, then his 
post trial table when corrected for dividends, interest, and the 
$10,000 chronological error, would reflect that there was 
$82,428.76 remaining from the community property February balance 
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in the Schwab account before the $176,000 check cleared. However, 
correcting Appellant's math in his Post Trial Brief was purely 
academic since the $342,149 "income" was a community property 
deposit, as the Court properly concluded. Finally, in addressing 
the alleged trace the Court properly considered the parties' 
intent. 
It was not the parties' intent to use Vel tex monies to 
purchase the Ketchum Condominium and Appellant only attempted such 
a trace belatedly in this case by ignoring the parties intent after 
applying too narrow of a time period to a purported last minute and 
undeveloped indirect trace under Josephson v. Josephson, 115 Idaho 
1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). Amy testified that the 
Ketchum Condo was purchased knowing that they were going to use the 
proceeds from the sale of their McCall lots and their McCall Cabin 
to buy the Ketchum Condominium. Tr., p. 588, L. 7-13. The 
appropriate trace time period should extend to September 11, 2007. 
The proceeds from the sale of the McCall Lots were $452,528 and the 
proceeds from the sale of the McCall Cabin were $231,683. Exhibit 
232, pages 2384 and 2385. The combined McCall proceeds of $684,211 
($452,528+231,683) were more than sufficient to fund the $205,539 
used to purchase Ketchum ($30,000 + $175,539) as well as the 
$400,000 paid in October 2007 to reduce the Ketchum mortgage. 
(Exhibit 232, page 2380). The proceeds from the sale of the McCall 
properties more than replenished Account # ... 3714, Bill's working 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 42 
capital commingled account, for the money temporarily removed for 
Ketchum. Tr., p. 588, L. 3 through p. 589, L. 9; Exhibit 232. 
When applying a trace under Josephson, supra, care must be taken to 
include the parties' intent in determining the overall effect of 
community monies in both assets, the 3714 account and Ketchum 
Condominium and to use the correct time span for the indirect 
trace. 
The Court properly stated and found: 
"Even apart from the above analysis, the Court cannot 
find that Bill traced the funds used for the Ketchum 
condominium down payment to a separate source. Bill had 
no other livelihood or source of income than that of a 
real estate developer. Accepting his testimony that the 
site for the Veltex building was acquired at the same 
time BED investments was formed, the LLC's didn't own the 
site until January of 1999, slightly less than two years 
prior to marriage. Given that construction wasn't 
completed until more than three years after marriage, and 
that there was no evidence of what, if any, income was 
earned by either BED investments or Veltex Building LLC, 
prior to marriage, Bill has not met his burden of tracing 
either the 2005 distribution, or the 2007 distribution, 
with reasonable certainty. 
Therefore, the funds drawn from Schwab 3714 to use as 
a down payment on the Ketchum condominium are community 
funds, and Bill is not entitled to reimbursement 
separately for any part of the amount." Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. R. 583. 
Appellant conflates the Magistrates Decision to serve his 
argument on appeal that the Judge misunderstood the issue. The 
bottom line for the Court is that based on this record and the 
evidence before it, what Bill received in 2007 was income and 
presumed to be community property. Bill could not carry his burden 
even by mislabeling the issue as "capital gains", because he failed 
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to trace with reasonable certainty and particularity that what he 
received was his separate property rather than compensation for his 
labor. The District Court properly rejected a second guessing of 
the fact finder attempted here again. 
The case of Wolford v. Wolford, 117 Idaho 61,785 P.2d 625 
(1990) dealing with whether there is an undistributed dividend 
which may actually be undistributed wage income, in a corporation, 
entitling the community to reach it, is not involved in this case, 
and is an irrelevant misdirect. Again, what Bill received was 
income. 12 
The community reimbursement rules are not involved in this 
case but rather the failure of Bill to identify and trace community 
income used to purchase the Ketchum Condominium. 
Nei ther are the community enhancement rules of Sherry v. 
Sherry, 108 Idaho 645, 701 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1985) or Swope v. 
Swope, 122 Idaho 296, 834 P.2d 298 (1992) applicable here. While 
Appellant may like to recharacterize the issue, Bill's problem is 
not found in those cases, but rather is found in his failure to 
overcome the community presumption of the income he received, 
coupled with his lack of credibility. 
12 Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 128, 525 P.3d 314, 323 
(1974) adds credence to the Trial Court's finding that what Bill 
received was compensation for his labor, but is not applicable to 
an inquiry of retained earnings in this case, because Bill 
actually received income, and Amy wasn't chasing retained 
earnings because Bill may not have been properly compensated. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Decision of the District Court must be upheld on appeal. 
Findings of Fact were not clearly erroneous, were supported by 
substantial evidence and the Magistrate did not abuse his 
discretion, as the District Court so concluded. Attorneys fees 
should be awarded to Respondent. 
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